MILNET Brief - Iranian Conventional Forces

MILNET Brief
The Iranian Conventional Forces - 2/18/2005

"Iran is now the only regional military power that poses a significant conventional military threat to Gulf stability. Iran has significant capabilities for asymmetric warfare, and poses the additional threat of proliferation. There is considerable evidence that it is developing both a long-range missile force and a range of weapons of mass destruction. It has never properly declared its holdings of chemical weapons, and the status of its biological weapons programs is unknown. The discoveries made by the IAEA since 2002 indicate that it is likely Iran will continue to covertly seek nuclear weapons."

- Iran's Developing Conventional Military Capabilities, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12/8/2004 . ¹⁴

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Iran From Space

Iran From Space

In General || Iranian Navy || Ballistic Missiles || Iranian Land Forces || Iranian Air Force

The quote above is from page one of the rather well written and cited document from CSIS. It goes on to outline the conventional threat from Iran, as if the nuclear threat wasn't enough to support U.S. President's Bush's declaration a few years back that Iran is part of an "Axis of Evil". Granted that Iran faced an implacable and vicious neighbor in Saddam Hussein, few doubt the removal of the semi-Baathist regime will also see Iran reducing and/or eliminating those items in inventory that threaten the region. Indeed, Iran has simply changed its rhetoric to point at the U.S. presence as Iraq as a similar threat to their own national security.

This self-fulfilling prophecy is typical of the region, however, and thus the CSIS analysis is appropriate. Iran is not about to disarm for any reason, the culture prohibits it.

CSIS has done an excellent job of covering the Mideast, and we use data gleaned from a total of four reports. We should note also that CSIS uses almost primarily data from the Institute for International Strategic Studies, a London think tank. MILNET has endeavored to look at other sources to ensure we are not relying on what amounts to a single source.

In General

The CSIS report ¹⁴ states:

"Most of Iran's military equipment is aging or second rate and much of it is worn. Iran lost some 50-60% of its land order of battle in the climatic battles of the Iran-Iraq War, and it has never had large-scale access to the modern weapons and military technology necessary to replace them. It also has lacked the ability to find a stable source of parts and supplies for most of its Western-supplied equipment, and has not have access to upgrades and modernization programs since the fall of the Shah in 1979."

Iran has, however, been able to rebuild some of its conventional capabilities during 1988-2003, and make progress towards acquiring weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles. Iran faced major financial problems until the mid-1990s and could not obtain resupply or new weapons from most Western states. It has since, however, been able toaquire more significant numbers of weapons, particularly land-based weapons. According to U.S. intelligence estimates, Iran imported $20 billion worth of arms during 1996-1999, and $600 million from 2000-2003. Iran signed $1,700 million worth of new arms agreements during 1996-1999 and $500 million in new arms agreements during 2000-2003.

"This level of arms imports, however, is only about 35% to 50% of the level of imports necessary to recapitalize and modernize all of its forces. It also helps explain why Iran lacks advanced new C⁴I systems, and has not been able to modernize its air forces, ground based air defenses, or develop major amphibious warfare capabilities.

So why is Iran a threat? After reading the paragraphs above one would assume that Iran only presents a minor threat. The difficulty is that compared to other Gulf military capabilities, and especially those of its direct neighbors, Iran is significantly better well off. As the CSIS report ¹⁴ says:

"Nevertheless, Iran is still a significant military power by Gulf standards. It has some 540,000 men under arms and over 350,000 reserves. They include 120,000 Iranian Revolutionary Guards trained for land and naval asymmetrical warfare. Iran's military also includes holdings of 1,613 main battle tanks, 21,600 other armored fighting vehicles, 3,200 artillery weapons, 306 combat aircraft, 60 attack helicopters, 3 submarines, 59 surface combatants, and 10 amphibious ships."

Clearly, the numbers could be overwhelming in an engagement were they all able to be brought to bear. Of course such numbers of vehicles and troops in movement would hardly escape observation, especially with modern overhead surveillance, however, it is sobering to any nation with only half as many tanks or other armored vehicles. In other words, this is a force to be reckoned with -- even if they were not well trained and strategically savvy.

This brings to mind the issue of the average Iranian soldiers skill set. The CSIS report makes it clear that the Iranian war veteran has long ago left service, and will not be able to be called back -- having aged significantly along with the equipment. 200,000+ conscripted soldiers being trained by non battle hardened is hardly a recipe for crack troops.

Iranian Navy

Due to its position astride the Persian Gulf, Iran has constantly been a threat to the Gulf. The so called "Tanker" wars in the late 1980s put Iran squarely in the bullseye of all nations seeking to transport oil out of the region. Even the small navy that Iran puts to sea is capable enough to harass shipping, and several cases of small boat operations against oil well heads in the Gulf during that period made it clear small asymmetrical tactics of the Iranian Navy could be quite effective.

More concerning is the priority placed on expanding and modernizing its Navy. The CSIS report cites numerous areas where Iran has funded modernization including the most troublesome aspect, anti-shipping cruise missiles,

"...Iran has obtained new anti-ship missiles and missile patrol craft from China, midget submarines from North Korea, submarines from Russia, and modern mines."

The missiles procured are a cornucopia of military capabilities that produce a huge threat to the region and the Gulf. According several CSIS reports ^{12, 13, 14,
15}:

Missile	Propulsion	Range	Made in	Comments
Seersucker (HY-2 Sea Eagle or Silkworm)	?	80-90 km	China	RH or IR sea skimmer
CS-801 (Yinji)	Solid Fuel	74 km	China?	J-band Active Radar
CS-802	Turbojet (rocket booster)	70-75 mi.	China	Launcher Radar Operated
CS-801JK	?	20nm		Air launched
SS-N-22/P-270 Moskit (Sunburn or Sunburst) P80/P-100 Zubi/Onika (3M80E)	Ramjet (kerosene)	90km/120KM	Russia	M2 Active Radar (U.S. says not in inventory)

Delivery

To deliver cruise missiles the Navy may utilize a number of surface ships as well as several submarines:

#	Ship Type	Designation	Spd kts	Armament	Manu.
3	Submarine	Kilo (Type 877) Diesel Electric	17 sub 10 surf	six 530mm torp tubes Guided and autonomous Torpedoes with Sonar, passive homing, active homing or wire guided (one wired at a time) Wide array of mines AA Missile launcher in sail for SA-14 Strela Missile Sub has surface range of 3-6 K miles, and 400 miles submerged. Subs are said to need significant refits	ex-Soviet
3	Frigate	Vosper Mark 5 Sa-am Class	39	1x5 C-802 launcher 1-Mark 8, 4.5" Gun	U.K.
2	Corvette	Bayandor-class	18	2 76mm guns very austere sensors, warfare and fire control	U.S.
10	Fast Attack	Hudong-class		4 CS-801/802	China
10	Missile Patrol	Kaman-class	38	2-4 CS-801/802 1-76mm gun	French
3	Fast Attack	Chaho-class		BM-21 Rocket Lnchr 23mm Guns	N Korea
2	Patrol Craft	Cape-class		40 mm and 23 mm guns	U.S.
3	Patrol Craft	PGM-71 Parvin		40mm and 20mm guns
35	small patrol			machine guns SA-7/SA-14
5	Hovercraft	BH-7	60-70
7-8	Hovercraft	SRN-6	60-70
2	Minesweeper/ Minelayer	MSC-292/268 Shahrock
1	Minesweeper	Riazzi-class
1	Minesweeper	Conv. Ajar LST
4	LST	Hengam (Larak-class)		Can carry six tanks, 600 tons of cargo and 227 troops
3	LST	Hormuz-class		Can carry 9 tanks, 140 troops	Iran/S.Korea
3	LST	Hormuz-21		1800 ton capacity
3	LSL	Fouque-class		176 ton capacity

The CSIS report ¹⁴ cites various sources of mines used by the Iranian Navy including some 2000 mines from China, North Korea, and ex-Soviet mines. Iran has claimed to produce their own magnetic, influence, remote control, acoustic and free floating/free contact mines as well as sophisticated set timer mines. CSIS also reports on the possibility of the Iranians of having purchased Chinese EM-52 or MN-52 rocket propelled mines. These are fairly sophisticated and lie dormant until activated and target acquisition, sufficient to harass Gulf surface traffic.

It is also significant that the Iranian Navy has shelters and covert hides along the coast in on islands under their control in the Gulf, and clearly look to dominate the Gulf should the need arrive.

The CSIS report ¹⁴ states that:

"It is unlikely that the Kilos could survive for any length of time if hunted by a U.S. or British Navy air-surface-SSN hunter-killer team...If the Kilos did not face U.S. or British ASW forces, the Iranian Kilos could operate in or near the Gulf with considerable impunity..."

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard's land based anti-ship missile force combined with the capable high speed and maneuverable surface fleet make a deadly and near unpredictable asymmetric attack capability that creates an enormous threat to the Gulf.

A smaller, but as capable force is also maintained in the Caspian Sea along the Iranian northern border to that body of water, and thus Iran can create havoc there as well.

Thus it is MILNET's analysis that the Iranian Navy, despite its small size and underwhelming Naval Warfare bulk, remains a clear threat to the Persian Gulf -- CSIS analysts echo that conclusion as well.

Ballistic Missiles

Other land attack missiles are of great concern as well, Iran fielding ¹⁴a total of three SCUD derivatives and 2 more longer range missiles on the way.

Missile	Propulsion	Range	Made in	Comments
CSS-8		150 km	China
SCUD-B		300 km	Libya
SCUD-C		500 km	North Korea
Shahab-3	Solid Rocket	1300 km	North Korea/Iran
Shahab-4		2000 km	North Korea/Iran	Taepo Dong 1?
Taepo Dong 1		2000 km	North Korea
Taepo Dong 2		5-6 km	North Korea

The following diagram from the 2001 U.S. report ⁶ on non-proliferation demonstrates the ballistic missile capability of Iran:

Land Forces

The CSIS report ¹⁴ cites these numbers for Tanks in the Iranian Army:

Tank Type	Count	Manufacturer
M-47/48	150	U.S. (*)
M-60A1	150-160	U.S. (*)
Chieftain Mark 3/5s	100	U.K. (*)
T-54/55	250	Russia/Soviet
T-59	150-250 (35-?)	Russia/Soviet
T-72/S	480	Russia/Soviet
T-69II	150-250 ?	Russia/Soviet
Zulfiqar	100	Iranian made from T-72 and M48 pieces
Total Estimate	1600
* delivered prior to the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979

CSIS states ¹⁴ that the sustainable tank for is probably less than 1,000 tanks due to parts shortages and the like, however MILNET notes from other sources that the Iranian Zulfiqar tank manufacturing capability may also mean the Iranians may be able to reverse engineer and remanufacture many components for all of their inventories.

The report also states that the T-72s and Zulfiqar tanks have "relatively modern" fire-control, engines and transmissions. The Zulfiqar has the fire on-the-move capability making them an interesting adversary for most indigenous Gulf state armies. They also may have reactive armor and laser warning systems. However, as the total number of T-72s and Zulfiqar with such equipment is less than 600, and many of those T-72s may suffer from parts problems, MILNET is not convinced they could field all but a few divisions of these semi-modern capable tanks for an extended maneuver. In other words, a single full tilt battle against like equipped tanks could seriously impact Iran's tank inventory. Against a fully modernized foe, the Iranian tank force would not stand long. Unfortunately, the Gulf standard again comes into play, and except for the Israelis, Egyptian and Saudis, few other nations could withstand an aggression by the Iranian force. For instance here are 1999 estimates for several Middle Eastern Nations:

In terms of other land forces that include armored infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, Iran is fairly significant.

Country	Main Battle Tanks	Armored Personnel Carriers	Armored Fighting Vehicles (AFVs)	Comments
Israel	4300	9480	400	Modernized, well maintained
Egypt	4300	5980	1335	Fairly Modernized, maintained
Syria	4600	1500	3010	Fair maintained but much older technology
Iran	1565 (1000) *	865	670	Mostly older technology, maybe one to three full divisions of modern equipped
Jordan	1217	1100	224	Fair maintenance, old technology
Saudi Arabia	1055	2580	1655	Well Maintained, modernized regularly
Lebanon	315 (100)*	185	895	Well aged, poorly maintained, single battle ready only

Data compiled from the CSIS reports cited below ^{1, 4, 5, 7}

A Rand report ³ MILNET located cites data from an International Institute for Strategic Study

From a Rand Report on Iranian Military Strengths ³

The real alarming figures are comparisons over the decades since the fall of the Shah in 1979. A steady growth in new weapons, even "used" tanks and gear from other sources, shows a steady climb. From 500 tanks in 1980 to nearly 1300 in 1997 ⁴

The CSIS report ¹⁴ puts the number at 1600 by 1999, a tripling of forces in 2 decades. If Iran can sustain that trend, by 2020 they will be on par or exceeding all their neighbors. on that same same scale, they will near that of the Saudis in less than five more years. Of course this assumes all their funds are not going into nuclear weapons development. The CSIS report states that the Iranians have over half a billion in contracts with Russia alone, so it is unlikely that their conventional arms growth will abate substantially in the next few years.

Air Forces

The Iranian air forces are well aged and in poor maintenance. While mechanical units can be repaired with indigenous labor, Iranian ability to remanufacture avionics is limited. This does not keep them from trying. However, it is the CSIS assessment (and that of MILNET's sources) that the Iranian Air Force is less than functional.

Other CSIS data supports the fact that Iran has increased their modern aircraft numbers significantly since 1996. From some 290 fighter/attack aircraft in inventory, the air force increased their planes by some 130+, all fairly modern and capable. The Iranians have also added a small number (12) attack helicopters, and have plenty more on order.

The CSIS report ¹⁴ is actually a little unclear on the actual numbers of aircraft, their notation for the numbers of aircraft in a squadron differs in the same paragraph and we have a hard time "pulling out" the numbers. For instance in one paragraph the data reads

"Iran has seven air defense squadrons, with 2/20-25, -60 U.S. supplied F-14..."

The total could be up to to 50 F-14, but the "-60" is indecipherable unless this is some foreign export version called the "-60"? In any case, the U.S. aircraft in inventory are very poorly maintained, and the CSIS report also states that the Iranians have not been able to fly with Phoenix missiles since high tech materials required to keep them running have been exhausted and the U.S. has seen to it that Iran has not been able to procure replacements.

There is an effort to develop an indigenous aircraft but that does not appear to be viable yet, as are Iranian attempts to license and build MIG-29s. They have purchased two squadrons of the MIG-29s, very capable aircraft, however, any adversary would simply draw them off and go around these two squadrons, probably to face far inferior aircraft in their stead.

One troublesome aspect to Iranian aircraft procurement ¹⁴is the purchase of enough Chinese F-7M aircraft to fill a squadron. These are fairly capable aircraft for the region.

Aircraft	Made in	Count	Mission	Comments
F-14	U.S.	50	Air Defense	Poorly maintained, Little/no AAM, gun only
MiG-29	Russia	6	Air Defense	Highly capable, heavy maintenance costs, fuel hungry
F-7M	China	35	Air Defense	Fairly modern and capable
F-4D/E	U.S.	260	Attack/Defense	Very poorly maintained, parts not available to Iran some in ME market
F-5E/FII	U.S.	260	Attack/Defense	Very poorly maintained, parts not available from U.S., some in ME market
Su-24	Soviet	30	Attack	Some parts purchases with Russia have taken place, these may be the best maintained of all Iranian aircraft
Su-25K	Soviet	7	Attack	Seized during Gulf War (Iraq inexplictedly flew them out) May be operational but doubtful
Mir F-1	France	24	Attack/Defense	Seized during Gulf War (Iraq inexplictedly flew them out) May be operational but doubtful

The MILNET assessment is that the aircraft, while theoretically capable (especially in the case of the MiG-29 and F-14) are probably not maintained well enough and their pilots may lack the necessary combat skills in order to adequately pose a serious threat to their neighbors. HOWEVER, having said that, it does not take a lot of skill to let loose an airborne cruise missile upon shipping in the Persian Gulf. Thus the threat is perhaps in the direction of the water, rather than inland. In another report, MILNET looks at how to directly attack Iran in order to take out nuclear reactors and other nuclear development facilities. In that analysis, we purposely assumed that if the Iranians were to put up an aircraft borne defense, it would serve the purpose of the attacking force to remove them from the picture, quickly and efficiently, and with only minimal losses. It would serve both to eliminate that airborne air defense as well as to "pull any remaining teeth" from the Iranian Air Force, and would therefore be welcomed strategically.

Conclusion

Understanding the Arab mindset will help understand why Iran is hell bent on developing their other means of military and asymmetrical weapons and tactics. Iran believes they are a significant player in the Arab states. In fact, it is their clergy's belief that they are the standard bearers and others have fallen into European or even Russian complicity. And of course, looking at Israel's immense land force strength, Iran believes they must find some means to achieve parity. Thus the drive to further develop and increase their WMD capabilities in order to bolster their conventional forces.

At the same time, Iranian conventional forces while certainly not at the top of the list in the region, are significant enough to pose a threat to their neighbors, especially with long range ballistic missiles, and most significantly to shipping in the Persian Gulf. It is that last area, the waters of the Gulf that are most at risk from Iran, and we believe that Iran may find reasons in the future to use that strength as their culture dictates.

Thus Iran presents a double threat to the region, both conventionally as well as in terms of WMD. ⁸

Updates:

2/18/2005: President George Bush and his Secretary of State Condeleza Rice responded to a defiant announcement from Syria and Iran that they are forming an alliance to defend against a common threat. Bush and Rice both stated that the U.S. believes that a diplomatic solution remains their preferred choice and assured that there are no military plans although that option always "remains on the table". ¹¹

2/16/2005: Iran's Vice President announced that Iran and Syria are working together to from an alliance to protect against the common threat of U.S. aggression. The two nations, according to numerous sources are only confirming publicly what has been going on for decades, the intelligence services of the two countries cooperating with their support, direction, and sanctuary for Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as other terrorists, using Lebanon and Syria as sanctuaries while those terrorists continually attack Israel. ^{9, 10}

Note: Sometime well after this briefing was completed, CSIS, one of our chief sources for this briefing, restructured their web site, and updated many of their reports. We retain the old links for reason of completeness, however, you may find the links prior to source number 12 may be broken. Look at source 12 or beyond to find similar titles which will give you more updated information.

Sources:

Iran's Developing Conventional Military Capabilities, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Working Draft, December 8, 2004
Iran Army, Global Security.com, undated
Major Security Institution and their Constitution, Rand Report, date not known but cites studies by IISS thru 1999
Middle East Balance, Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, Major Arm Country and Zone, Qualitative Trends, Israel and the Ring of Arab Nations, Anthony H. Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2/24/1999
Middle East Balance, Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, Major Arm Country and Zone, Qualitative Trends, Saudi Arabia, Anthony H. Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12/28/1998
Proliferation: Threat and Response, U.S. Department of Defense January 2001 version (PDF: 4.29MB)
Iran's Evolving Military Forces, Anthony H. Cordeman, Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2004.
Iranian Progress Toward Developing Nuclear Weapons, MILNET, 1/28/2004
Axis of Evil Closes Ranks, MILNET Opinion, 2/16/2005
Iran, Syria Partnership Raises Eyebrows, Lize Porteus, Fox News Online, 2/17/2005
Bush: No Plans For War on Iran, A.P., Fox News Online, 2/18/2005
Military Balance in the Middle East - IV. Overview, Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, Arab-Israeli Balance, Anthony H. Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International Studies,12/27/1998 (replacement for 4?)
Military Balance in the Middle East - XIII: The Southern Gulf: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Yemen, Anthony H. Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International Studies,12/28/1998 (replacement for 5?)
Iran's Developing Conventional Military Forces, Anthony H. Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International Studies,12/09/2004 (replacement for 1 and 7?)
Military Balance in the Middle East - IX: The Northern Gulf: Iran, Anthony H. Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International Studies,12/28/1998
The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars, Draft, Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid Al-Rodhan, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 6/28/2006
How Big Is Iran's Military, Reuters, 7/2/2008